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GERT JAN VAN DER WILT
TOWARDS A TWO TIER HEALTH SYSTEM 
IN THE NETHERLANDS: HOW TO PUT 
THEORY INTO PRACTICE
ABSTRACT. The Dutch health care system is developing a two, or multiple, tier 
system. How can moral principles be of help in assessing whether this is the right 
track? Instead of dismissing as unhelpful the principles that have been suggested 
so far and exchanging them for other, usually more complex, principles, it is sug­
gested,that the methods of moral inquiry be reconsidered.
Key Words: diversification in health care, health care financing, public and private 
responsibility in health care
I. THE DUTCH HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
The health care system in The Netherlands is increasingly taking 
on the characteristics of a two tier, or perhaps multiple tier, system. 
The following explains what is meant by a two, or multiple, tier 
system, and specifies recent developments which warrant this 
conclusion.
A. Two Tier Health Care Systems: Definition
The term two, or multiple, tier health care system refers to a system 
where two, or more, categories of services can be distinguished for 
which different conditions hold regulating the relation between uti­
lization of services and costs at the individual level. For example, if 
the costs of physician services are fully covered by compulsory 
health care insurance and co-payments are required for prescribed 
medication, then, according to the definition, this system has at least 
two tiers: one tier where the incremental costs of utilization are zero, 
and one where the incremental costs of utilization are non-zero.
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Using this definition, most health care systems in the Western 
world will probably be two, or multiple, tier systems. What is 
important, however, is to assess the content of the difference by 
asking questions such as the following. Are the costs of utilization 
of all services, except the extra costs of first-class hospitalization, 
covered by compulsory insurance? Are services such as in vitro fer­
tilization and plastic surgery excluded from reimbursement? Are 
co-payments required for urinary incontinence material?
Because of differences such as these, health care systems can 
be two, or multiple, tier systems to different degrees. Further, they 
evolve and develop, becoming more or less strongly a two, or 
multiple, tier system.
B. Evidence for the Alluded Transition of the Dutch Health Care System 
Two types of evidence will substantiate the thesis that the health 
care system in the Netherlands is becoming a two, or multiple, tier 
system. 1) Intentions for health care reform that have been pub­
licly communicated, either by the Dutch government itself or by 
committees installed by the government. These intentions have as 
yet not been fully implemented and are still the subject of much 
controversy. 2) Actual changes which have already taken place in 
both the organization and the financing of health care services, 
thereby leading to stronger diversification.
C. Intentions for Health Care Reform
During the past few years, the Dutch government has tried to re­
form the financing and organizations of the health care system and 
to gain broader social support for such reforms, with only partial 
success. Presently, two major types of health care insurance exist 
in The Netherlands. Those with an annual income below Dfl 56,000, 
approximately 62% of the population, have compulsory health care 
insurance. Their entitlements are laid down by law. The executing 
organizations are local sick funds, and premiums are, to a large 
extent, income dependent. Insurees in this category have little 
freedom to choose between different levels of coverage and only 
very recently was the possibility created to choose among different 
levels of personal risk (Minutes of the Parliament 23 567, nrs. 1-3, 
1993—1994). Those with an annual income above Dfl 56,000, approx­
imately 38% of the population, are free to decide whether they 
wish to purchase private health care insurance. By far, most of them 
have private insurance. Premiums are not income dependent, and
there is much more freedom to choose between more or less exten­
sive coverage and to choose a level of personal risk. The general 
impression is that people receive the same care, irrespective of 
their mode of insurance. Importantly, however, remuneration for 
health care providers differs, depending upon the mode of insur­
ance of their patients. While the government wishes to create a 
single, compulsory basic health care insurance for all, insurance 
premiums affect health care options. Premiums should be income 
dependent, but in other respects this basic health insurance should 
more closely resemble current private health insurance, with the 
possibility to opt for more or less extensive coverage, various levels 
of personal risk etc. In view of this policy objective, the question 
is: Which benefits should be included in the basic benefits package? 
It was the task of the government committee Choices in Health Care 
to answer this question.
D. The Government Committee on Choices in Health Care
The government committee Choices in Health Care, chaired by Pro­
fessor Dunning, a cardiologist, was asked to develop criteria to 
distinguish between basic and non-basic health care (Choices in 
Health Care, 1992). For basic health care, a compulsory health care 
insurance was envisaged, with the costs of non-basic health care 
services covered by voluntary supplementary insurance or paid 
out-of-pocket. Clearly, adoption of such a scheme would create a 
two tier system. The committee suggested that basic services should 
meet each of the following criteria: 1) the service should be neces­
sary from a societal perspective; 2) the effectiveness and efficiency 
of the service should be sufficiently demonstrated; and, 3) the 
costs should be such that they cannot be reasonably expected to be 
borne by the individual. On the basis of these criteria, the commit­
tee argued that services such as in vitro fertilization, physiother­
apy, homeopathic drugs, and dental care for people aged 19 years 
or more do not qualify as basic care and should not be financed 
through income dependent premiums for compulsory health care 
insurance.
E. A Second Criterion: Insurability
The government committee Choices in Health Care also discussed 
the aspect of insurability, i.e., whether the financial risks associ­
ated with the utilization of a particular health care service can be 
insurable if people are free to decide whether or not to have this
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risk covered by their health insurance (Choices in Health Care, 1992). 
This insurability depends upon factors such as the magnitude of 
the risk, i.e., the number of people at risk and the costs of utilization 
of services, the predictability of the risk, and whether the value of 
services can be readily appreciated by non-users. Predictability is 
high, for example, in the case of genetic pre-dispositions such as 
cystic fibrosis, Huntington's chorea, Down's syndrome etc., and in 
case of chronic diseases such as rheumatoid arthritis and Crohn's 
or Gaucher's disease, for it is known that persons with these dis­
eases w ill continue to make use of certain medical services. The 
value of services is usually readily appreciated by non-users in 
the case of life-saving treatment modalities. However, it is often 
more difficult to appreciate the value of services which contribute 
to quality of life. It is much more difficult for non-users to appre­
ciate, for instance, the value of speech therapy to patients with 
Parkinson's disease.
Can the financial risk associated with utilization of the service easily be insured?
Docs the service roeet the criteria of necessity, 
cfTecüvcness, efficience and non-aObniability?
NO YES
YES Services that are the prime 
responsibility of the community 
that should be shielded from any 
market mechanisms.
Basic package of health care 
services; compulsory insurance; 
managed competition; capping 
budgets.
NO
1
Supplementary services; voluntary 
insurance; out-of-pocket payments; 
and market-incentives.
Figure 1.
Combining the criteria of the Choices in Health Care committee with 
the insurability criterion gives rise to four categories of services 
(Figure 1). These categories of services differ in the sense that they 
are, to various degrees, the subject of both public and individual 
responsibility. Services that meet the criteria proposed by the 
Choices in Health Care committee, but which are difficult to insure, 
should be entirely shielded from any market mechanism; the pro­
vision and utilization of these services was considered a prime 
responsibility of the community, and a prominent regulatory role 
for the central government was recommended. Services that do 
not meet the criteria proposed by the government committee, but 
which can be easily insured, should be covered by a supplemen­
tary, voluntary health care insurance or be paid out-of-pocket.
These services are primarily a matter of individual responsibility, 
and a market mechanism was considered appropriate as a reg­
ulative principle. Individual freedom should prevail, and it was 
deemed acceptable that individuals experience the consequences 
of their choices, both in monetary terms and in terms of access to 
services. Most health care services should be classified in the third 
category: they meet the criteria of the government committee and 
are fairly well insurable, so that most people would probably want 
these risks covered by their health insurance. These services are 
subject to a mixture of individual and public responsibility. Compul­
sory insurance was envisaged for these services, as well as 
managed competition among providers, global budgets for health 
care purchasing insurance companies, and various levels of per­
sonal risk for the insurees. Logically, the criteria give rise to yet 
another category of services: those that do not meet the criteria of 
necessity, effectiveness, efficiency and non-affordability, and which 
are difficult to insure. No one has worried so far about services 
that belong to this category. For this reason, they will not be con­
sidered. Thus, three categories of services are distinguishable, with 
different mixes of public and private responsibilities.
The government has not fully adopted the recommendations of 
the committee. Rather, it was decided that adoption of such a system 
would not be feasible on technical grounds and, therefore, opted 
for a two tier system consisting of a package of basic services 
whose costs are covered by compulsory insurance with income 
dependent premiums, as distinguished from non-essential services 
whose costs are covered by voluntary, supplementary insurance or 
paid out-of-pocket. This reform is currently being implemented 
gradually
F. The Actual Existence of Multiple Tiers in the Dutch Health Care 
System
Presently, multiple tiers exist primarily for those who are privately 
insured. This includes both a basic package and the possibility of 
purchasing supplementary insurance. Insurees can choose among 
different levels of personal risk, with co-payments required for 
some services. An explicit policy objective of the Dutch govern­
ment in 1994 was to finance health care through co-payments of 
at least 15% (Financial Overview Care, 1994). An overview is pre­
sented in Table I which distinguishes between: 1) costs of services 
that are covered by standard private health insurance, including
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TABLE I. Review of health care services of which the costs are covered by 
standard private health care insurance or by supplementary insurance
Costs of health care that are usually 
covered by standard private health 
insurance:
Costs of services which can be covered 
by supplementary health care 
insurance:
Without the requirement of discretionary 
judgment or co-payments:
Hospitalization 
Home nursing, if it shorten the 
duration of hospitalization 
Out-patient clinical services 
Delivery
Dental care for persons under the 
age of 19 
Prescribed medication 
Psychiatric care 
Audiology 
Dialysis 
Oral Surgery
Reimbursement is usually subject to 
discretionary judgment:
Home dialysis
Plastic surgery following trauma 
Organ transplantation
services delivered by a general practioner 
Preventive services (cardiovascular 
examination, cervical and breast 
cancer screening, certain vaccinations, 
tests of serum cholesterol).
In vitro fertilization (subject to a number 
of conditions and to discretionary 
judgment; the costs of a maximum 
of three treatments are 
reimbursed).
Sterilization
Physiotherapy and remedial therapy 
Speech therapy 
Maternity care
Dental care for persons 19 years of 
age or older 
Homeopathic or anthroposofic services
Co-payment currently required:
Psychotherapy
Aids and devices, such as urinary 
incontinence material, prostheses, 
walking aids, aids for patients with 
diabetes, hearing and visual aids, 
mamma prostheses, orthopedic footware.
those instances where discretionary judgment of the insurance 
company is required1 and those instances where co-payments 
are required, and, 2) costs of services for which supplementary 
insurance can be purchased. The situation is further complicated
because some of the costs are covered by yet another arrangement 
called the AWBZ (General Law Extraordinary Costs of Disease, 
1993-1994). However, I will not elaborate upon this point further 
since it is only a temporary arrangement and a detail of the current 
reform of the Dutch health care system. Sick funds have more of 
the characteristics of a single tier system where the possibility of 
choosing among different levels of coverage is less extensive. Only 
recently, in its endeavor to merge the two types of insurance, has 
the government created the same possibility of choosing among 
different levels of personal risk for those insured by the sick funds, 
with co-payments required for the same services as in the case of 
private health insurance. Thus, different tiers of health services 
can be distinguished and, in view of these policy objectives, this 
development is likely to continue in the near future.
II. IS A TWO, OR MULTIPLE, TIER HEALTH CARE
SYSTEM MORALLY DESIRABLE?
Clearly, a two, or multiple, tier health care system rests upon the 
assumption that not all health care needs and services are equal. 
There are health care needs and services which have features such 
that we may legitimately expect compliance with norms and rules, 
thereby reflecting institutionalized solidarity. On the other hand, 
some health care needs and services have features such that indi­
vidual choices and preferences are respected. This raises two ques­
tions. 1) Is there any evidence for such diversity? 2) If so, in what 
respect does it warrant differentiation in the financing of health 
care?
A. Evidence for Diversity in Health Care Services 
Considerable diversity in health care needs and services exists, 
and this diversity continues to increase. Mental health care is a 
case in point. In 1994, the Dutch government reallocated approxi­
mately Dfl 50 million in this sector, taking it away from general 
mental hospitals and making it available for ambulatory psychi­
atric care, including da}' care and home care, and for projects such 
as employment rehabilitation (Financial Overview Care, 1994). 
The rationale for this process was that the standard care could no 
longer adequately meet the needs of those seeking this type of 
care. Such diversification of care is quite a general phenomenon in
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the health care sector. It indicates that more importance is attrib­
uted to development and adoption of types of care which better 
suit individual preferences. The resulting multiplicity of health 
care services is not compatible with a financing scheme that is 
largely single tiered. If health care services are developed and 
adopted in order to more adequately meet the individual needs of 
health care consumers, it is no longer self-evident that the costs 
associated with the utilization of these services should be covered 
by a single, non-individualized financing system. If we wish to 
reduce this friction, we can either choose to sanction this develop­
ment in health care, or try to redress it. Creating a two, or multi­
ple, tier financing system of health care is a way of sanctioning 
this development. Yet, is it the right thing to do? This brings me to 
the second question: Do health care services and needs for health 
care differ in such a way that differentiation in financing is, 
thereby, warranted?
B. Conflicting Values and Indeterminate Principles 
A two, or multiple, tier health care system reflects the idea that 
trade-offs between the requirements of conflicting values such as 
solidarity and autonomy should be made differently, depending 
upon the features of the health care needs and services. Solidarity 
reflects, as De Beaufort has said in a background paper for the 
Choices in Health Care committee, that we know about someone 
else's well being, that we care about someone else's well being, 
and that we are prepared to take appropriate action (De Beaufort, 
1992). It is close to a feeling of shared responsibility, and the feeling 
that we are in a position to prevent harm or to change something 
for the better, and that we not only can do something, but that 
we should do something. Often, we fail in this respect. First, we 
should care to know. Yet, in order to know we have to ask, listen, 
or empathize, and we must feel that we can do something, i.e., that 
our contribution would make a difference. These conditions some­
times hold in our private spheres, but in the public sphere things 
are quite different. There, solidarity is institutionalized by adopt­
ing compulsory health care insurance schemes and expressing sol­
idarity between the healthy and the sick and between the rich and 
the poor. The government is held responsible for establishing and 
maintaining such schemes. On the part of the citizen, compliance 
with the norms and rules of such schemes is expected. The question, 
however is: In which cases can such compliance be legitimately
expected? The current debate in The Netherlands indicates that 
solidarity is not considered unconditional. For example, if someone 
behaves in a manner of which I strongly disapprove and there is 
not sufficient basis for dialogue to overcome this difference of 
opinion, an appeal to solidarity is possibly misplaced, probably 
ineffective, and may work out inappropriately. The problem is that 
by stretching solidarity too far, it may loose its meaning altogether. 
In this respect, the recommendations of the government com­
mittee Choices in Health Care can be understood as implying that 
an appeal to solidarity should be made only in those cases where 
the four conditions of necessity, effectiveness, efficiency, and non­
affordability hold. These, then, are the relevant features by which 
health care services differ from each other, thereby warranting some 
differentiation in their financing. But, when is the provision of a 
health care service necessary from the social perspective? If health 
care should enable us to participate within society in a normal way, 
what does this "normality" mean? We could say that the ambiguity 
or indeterminacy of the principle of solidarity is merely exchanged 
for the ambiguity and indeterminacy of the principle of "necessity 
from the social perspective." Indeed, the introduction of the four 
conditions which should be met by health care services to qualify 
as basic care has done little to resolve the question of where the 
line should be drawn, i.e., which services do, and which services 
do not, qualify for public funding. The Dutch government has 
tried to stimulate a public debate on choices in health care (Choices 
in Health Care, 1992). This public debate, however, has not gotten 
off the ground. Indeed, very little has been done to further opera­
tionalize the criteria of the committee. Thus, although we seem to 
be fairly capable of identifying relevant criteria and moral princi­
ples, we have great difficulty in reaching agreement on what 
follows from these principles in specific cases.
The predicament is by no means an exception. One of the leading 
philosophers who has contributed to our thinking about justice in 
health care, Norman Daniels, seems to be retracing his steps. In 1985, 
his book, Just Health Care, was published (Daniels, 1985). In this 
book, Daniels addressed the question of what it is that makes the 
provision of care the appropriate target of collective responsibility 
and concern. The answer which he suggest is: impact on an indi­
vidual's fair share of the normal opportunity range. Impaired health 
can reduce this share and, to the extent that health care can either 
prevent this from happening, restore, or compensate for this, its
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provision is a collective responsibility. This fair equality of oppor­
tunity account of justice in health care is consistent with a two tier 
system insofar as health care services which do not contribute to 
this ideal of fair equality of opportunity do not qualify for public 
funding. However, in his paper presented to the inaugural congress 
of the International Association for Bioethics, Daniels casts doubt 
on the practical significance of his account to resolve resource 
allocation problems in health care (Daniels, 1993). Specifically, he 
suggests that his fair equality of opportunity principle might be 
too indeterminate to allow conclusions to be drawn regarding the 
propriety of the public funding of particular services. Although this 
self-criticism is, perhaps, in itself, laudable, I do not agree with it. I 
agree that there is a problem, but the problem is not the indetermi­
nacy of the principle.
in. THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE
Having defined one or more principles which should enable a dis­
tinction to be made between basic and non-basic health care ser­
vices, little progress has been achieved in assessing what follows 
from these principles in specific cases. This results in a striking gap 
between theory and practice, for there is the report of the govern­
ment committee on the one hand, and there are specific decisions 
on reimbursement involving co-payments for urinary incontinence 
material, psychotherapy, supplementary insurance needed to cover 
the costs of speech therapy, physiotherapy etc., on the other. Rarely 
is there a reference made in these kinds of decisions to these type 
of principles. Further, when a reference is made, it is in a strictly 
deductive way. For example, in the case of in vitro fertilization, it 
is tacitly assumed that we can infer what follows from a general 
principle by deductive reasoning only. The model of moral dis­
course which I recommend is a more hermeneutic, interpretive 
mode of reasoning which challenges this assumption.
4
A. Casuistry: A Neglected but Valuable Contribution to the Public 
Debate on Health Care Reform
The hermeneutic model that I recommend was described by 
Brennan (Brennan, 1977). It is a formal model of the structure of 
normative discourse whose moral principles are inherently open- 
textured insofar as they do not allow for the possibility of defining
conditions which are both necessary and sufficient for their correct 
application. Moral principles have this feature in common with 
many other principles, at least the more interesting ones such as 
legal principles (Gaskins, 1992). Moral inquiry begins with the con­
jecture that an act is either morally right, or morally wrong, for 
instance because it is an unjustified infringement on someone else's 
autonomy. Brennan calls this the moral hypothesis. The outcome 
of this moral inquiry is a moral judgment, i.e., a statement about 
the truth or falsity of the initial hypothesis. The inquiry consists of 
stating explicitly those features which render the act in question 
morally wrong and comparing the case with other cases known to 
be classified by the same principle of respect for autonomy. A 
central feature of this model is that it is primarily through knowl­
edge of particular cases that we come to understand the meaning 
of the principle, thereby allowing the identification of certain acts, 
or situations, as either morally right or wrong. Moral discourse is 
concerned with whether a particular classification is correct, and 
whether specific similarities, or dissimilarities, with other cases are 
correctly identified and relevant. When agreement is reached on 
the correctness of a particular classification, this may, though it need 
not, entail a change in the meaning of the principle. In Brennan's 
model, assessing what follows from our commitment to a moral 
principle in a particular context is called the process of explication. 
If we fail to reach agreement on the question of whether a particu­
lar explication is right or not, we can take recourse to the rationale 
of the principle, i.e., why we should be committed to the principle. 
The rationale acts as a controlling norm by questioning whether 
a particular explication is plausible in view of the rationale of the 
principle. Any rationale will usually be closely linked to some 
world view.
B. Different Levels of Sophistication of Normative Discourse 
With this model, we can distinguish different level of sophistica­
tion of normative discourse. These are schematically presented in 
Figure 2. In each case, the question is whether a particular health 
care service, in vitro fertilization, for example, qualifies for public 
funding.
In [1], the question is addressed without making explicit refer­
ence to a moral concept that would serve to guide our decision or 
judgment. In many debates, arguments are advanced either to 
support or to challenge the public funding of this service without
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I. Does this particular intervention constitute a worth-while expenditure of scarce
resources?
n A particular conception of justice, such as Daniel's Fair Equality of Opportunity.
Does this particular intervention constitute a worth-while expenditure of scarce 
resources, in view of the requirements of the particular conception of justice?
m A particular conception of justice, including its explication: an answer to the question
of what follows from it in a particular case.
Paradigm Cases: 
interventions 
that 
clearly qualify 
for public funding
Does this particular intervention 
constitute a worth-while expenditure of 
scarce resources, in view of the 
requirements of the particular conception 
of justice in health care and its
explication?
Paradigm Cases; 
interventions 
that clearly 
do not qualify for 
public funding
rv. Rationale of the particular account of justice: the answer to the question of why we
should be committed to it.
A particular conception of justice, such as 
Daniels' Fair Equality of Opportunity Account, 
including its explication', an answer to the 
question of what follows from it in a particular
case.
Paradigm Cases: Does this particular intervention Paradigm Cases:
interventions constitute a worth-while expenditure of interventions
that scarce resources, in view of the that clearly
clearly qualify requirements of the particular conception do not qualify for
for public fonding of justice in health care, its 
explication and its rationale?
public funding
Figure 2.
explicitly referring to any moral principle.2 For example, there is 
no reference to the underlying utilitarian concept of justice in the 
assertion that purchasing in vitro fertilization does not constitute 
value for money.
In [2], a particular concept of justice is brought to bear on the 
question. Reasoning from what would follow, for instance, from 
Daniels' concept of justice, one tries to reach a decision on this par­
ticular issue. However, according to Brennan's model, it is not 
possible through deductive reasoning alone to assess whether this 
particular employment of resources is consistent with the require­
ments of the fair equality of opportunity account. To assume
that it is, testifies of a commitment to what is sometimes called the 
"engineering approach" in ethics.
In [3], a particular concept of justice is also brought to bear on 
the question, but primarily by comparing this case with other cases 
which are classified by the concept. The question is raised, then, to 
what extent in vitro fertilization is similar or dissimilar to other 
health care services whose public funding is far less controversial. 
If agreement on correct classification is reached, the case that was 
under scrutiny can serve as a means by which future cases are 
assessed. Thus, each process of explication contributes to the mean­
ing of the concept. Instead of applying one concept to the question 
at hand, it is equally possible to apply two competing concepts to 
a single case, thus establishing the manner by which such conflicts 
are resolved in individual cases.
In [4], the most full-fledged type of normative discourse, accord­
ing to Brennan's model, is represented. If agreement on the correct 
explication of a moral principle fails to materialize, it may be 
worthwhile to examine whether its rationale will be of help. In the 
case of Daniels' principle, this would mean that the wider Rawlsian 
concept of justice must be considered, as well as its contractual 
nature and associated assumptions. It is certainly possible that this 
will still fail to bring about agreement. However, the possibilities 
of normative discource will have been fully exploited.
rv. CONCLUSION
In the debate on the reform of the Dutch health care system, nor­
mative discourse is frequently stuck at the second level. However, 
according to Brennan's model, nothing can be inferred from general 
principles unless we identify other cases which we believe are clas­
sified by the principle, and compare the case under scrutiny with 
these. This more casuistic approach has become discredited, though 
there are some signs of a revaluation (Jonsen and Toulmin, 1988). 
Also, there is an increasing resistance to referring to world views 
when addressing moral problems. The reason for this is that our 
presumed commitment to pluralism entails that incompatible world 
views may all be equally valid. Would it not be naive, therefore, to 
hold that a reference to the rationale of a moral principle would 
resolve our problems? I do not pretend to have answers to these 
intricate issues where pluralism seems to spill over into relativism.
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What I do claim, however, is that the third and fourth levels of 
normative discourse are relatively neglected and that, up to this 
point, we have failed to engage in a satisfactory public debate on 
the desirability of the changes to which our health care system is 
subject. Therefore, it may be worthwhile to reconsider our methods 
of moral inquiry.
NOTES
1 I mention separately the reimbursement arrangement which is subject to the 
discretionary judgment of the health care insurance company because of the rela­
tive autonomy companies have in their decisions, It is a possible source of geo­
graphical variation, although, to my knowledge, few, if any, systematic studies 
have been undertaken to examine this,
2 See, for example, the interesting report by Re dm ay ne and Klein on the decisions 
by local health care authorities to purchase in vitro fertilization.
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